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Introduction 
Disaster struck near Niagara Falls, New York in the summer of 1976. Toxic waste, 
improperly buried by a chemical company in the 1940s, seeped into the homes around the area of 
Love Canal (Switzer and Bulan 2002). Residents blamed the hazardous waste for community 
wide health issues. The Love Canal Homeowners Association alleged that 56% of the 
community’s newborns suffered some birth defect (Switzer and Bulan 2002). The community 
demanded the federal government to take action while the state of New York evacuated 200 
families and declared it a health emergency (Switzer and Bulan 2002). Having held office for 
only a few months, President Carter was met with one of his first national emergencies. He 
declared Love Canal a national disaster in 1978 and proposed a bill to address the issue in 1979. 
This bill would evolve to become the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980.  
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA) was the first major law in US history to address hazardous waste disposal. Of course, 
lawmakers had previously pursued waste cleanup legislation, but these bills did not match 
CERCLA’s ambition. CERCLA established a $1.6 billion fund, mostly paid for by the oil and 
chemical industries, to finance the cleanup of areas contaminated by improperly disposed toxic 
waste. It allowed the federal government to sue the companies responsible for the contamination 
and compensated the victims for whatever hardship they suffered from it.  
No bill, large or small, is guaranteed to survive its first journey through the legislative 
process. It can take years, sometimes decades, for a bill to become law. Waterway user charge 
bills throughout the 20th century are a great example. In his book Congressional Odyssey, T.R. 
Reid compares waterway user charge bills to perennial flowers: these bills sprout at the start of 
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every Congress, but die after two years, only to sprout again in the new Congress (Reid 1980). 
These bills may eventually become law, like the Inland Waterways Revenue Act of 1978. This 
bill had been introduced over and over for decades but never survived the legislative process, not 
until the 95th Congress passed it and President Carter signed it (Reid 1980). A more recent 
example of repeated legislative failure is health care reform. Several presidents have attempted 
health care reform but fell short of enacting universal health care coverage. It was not until 2010 
that President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law, America’s first universal health 
care coverage law. 
CERCLA was an exception to this pattern of repeated legislative failure. It navigated the 
legislative process, from introduction to passage, during the 96th Congress alone. This bill 
achieved in two years what other bills, some less controversial, achieved in decades. Why was 
CERCLA passed so quickly? The answer lies in the political environment of the 96th Congress. 
Toward the end of the 20th century the Republican party controlled the White House and 
the Democrats controlled Congress. This pure divided government characterized American 
government from 1969 to 1993 (Binder 2003). However, standing alone in the middle of this 
period was a single Democratic presidential term. In 1976 Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, a 
Democrat, defeated Republican incumbent Gerald Ford and became president in 1977. For the 
first time in ten years a single party controlled the White House and both chambers of Congress. 
Carter’s administration and the 96th Congress would be the last example of a unified government 
until the 103rd Congress during Bill Clinton’s presidency. But a unified government cannot 
explain on its own why CERCLA passed the 96th Congress. In fact, researchers have found that 
not all unified governments are the most productive at passing bills (Dodd and Schraufnagel 
2009).  
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So, if unified government is not necessary for policy productivity, then what explains the 
passage of CERCLA? Three characteristics of the political environment during the 96th 
Congress are important for this discussion: a presidential partisan majority, presidential rhetoric, 
and party polarization. This essay will argue that these three characteristics made the 96th 
Congress the best possible environment for passing comprehensive, environmental reform. 
Background 
It is important to first understand how CERCLA came to be. Attempts to address the 
Love Canal disaster began in the first session of the 96th congress. Two bills were introduced. 
Representative Mario Biaggi, a Democrat from New York, introduced the first bill, the 
Comprehensive Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (HR 
85), on January 15, 1979. HR 85 survived the committee process, but failed to pass the House 
(Switzer and Bulan 2002). President Carter proposed the second bill, the Oil, Hazardous 
Substances and Hazardous Waste Response, Liability and Compensation Act (S 1480), to 
Senators John Culver and Edmund Muskie who introduced it on July 11 (Switzer and Bulan 
2002). This bill created a $4 billion fund with 88% of the funding paid for by taxes on the 
chemical industry (Kronholm 1980b p. 2). While S 1480 would not go far during the first 
session, it would play a significant role the next year. No environmental reform bill passed in 
1979.  
Representative James Florio introduced the third bill, HR 7020, on April 22, 1980 
(Switzer and Bulan 2002). Florio was a New Jersey Democrat in his third term. He was a 
member of the House Commerce committee where he served as chairman for the Subcommittee 
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness. Florio thought S 1480 went too far, 
believing that a $4 billion fund was an excessive tax burden for the oil and chemical industries. 
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At the same time, Florio believed that chemical companies had an obligation to contribute to the 
fund. Therefore his bill established a $600 million fund. Fees on the oil and chemical industries 
would pay for half while the other half would come from the federal government’s general tax 
revenue (Daytona Beach Morning Journal 1980). This 50-50 split was the product of 
negotiations between Florio and the Chemical Manufacturers of America (CMA), a group 
representing the interests of the chemical industry. As chairman of the Commerce Subcommittee, 
Florio had an advantage in maneuvering his version of reform to the House floor. His 
subcommittee reported the bill to the full Commerce committee, which then approved the bill.  
 But before HR 7020 could make it to the House floor it had to overcome one more 
obstacle. Democratic Representative Al Ullman was an influential twelve-year veteran from 
Oregon and was the chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee. Upon the 
Commerce committee’s passage of HR 7020, Ullman requested to see the bill because he 
believed the proposed fees on the oil and chemical industries were actually a tax (Daytona Beach 
Morning Journal 1980). The Ways and Means committee amended HR 7020 in a number of 
ways. A member of the committee, New York democrat Thomas Downey, saw the bill and 
called it “grossly inadequate” (Daytona Beach Morning Journal 1980). He offered an amendment 
that doubled Florio’s original fund, from $600 million to $1.2 billion, and shifted the burden of 
the fund away from the government and onto the oil and chemical industries (Daytona Beach 
Morning Journal 1980). Instead of the 50-50 split proposed in Florio’s bill, Downey’s 
amendment made the industries responsible for 75% while the government was responsible for 
25% (Daytona Beach Morning Journal 1980). The Environmental Protection Agency applauded 
the changes and the Ways and Means committee unanimously approved the amended HR 7020 
(Daytona Beach Morning Journal 1980). These changes did not sit well with the chemical 
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industry. Robert Roland, President of the CMA, was appalled and stated he was “extremely 
disappointed the committee saw fit to add amendments which jeopardize the carefully balanced 
compromise approach to industry funding” (Daytona Beach Morning Journal 1980). 
 In June the Resource Protection subcommittee chairman Senator John Culver, the same 
Senator who introduced Carter’s proposal, drafted his own version of the bill. His version 
established an $800 million fund with $700 million paid for by taxes on the chemical industry 
and the other $100 million paid for by the government (‘Superfund’ ok’d 1980 p. 5). His bill 
passed the Senate Environment committee and quickly drew the support of President Carter and 
Douglas Costle, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, who stated, 
“President Carter has expressed his personal commitment to getting a superfund bill passed in 
this session” (‘Superfund’ ok’d 1980 p. 5). Although significantly smaller than the House 
alternative, the bill still did not satisfy Roland who claimed the bill was “unnecessarily broad and 
punitive” (‘Superfund’ ok’d 1980 p. 5). 
 By September the House was ready to take up the new HR 7020, but Florio, not satisfied 
with the Ways and Means committee doubling of his bill, sought a way to reduce the size of the 
bill to something more favorable to the CMA (Sinclair 1980). Meanwhile, the Senate committees 
on Commerce and Finance held hearings on S 1480. Lobbyists for the railroad, trucking, and 
barge industries testified before the committee arguing that they should not have to pay since 
they did not manufacture chemicals (Industries hit 1980 p. 15). Costle appeared before the 
Finance committee and defended taxpayers, saying that they should not have to pay for crises 
they did not cause (Industries hit 1980 p. 15). The $4 billion bill caught the attention of state 
governors as well. Missouri Governor Joseph Teasdale voiced his support for the strict bill 
saying, “Anything less will be insufficient to protect the public health” (Kronholm 1980a p. 16). 
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CMA did not share his feelings. CMA Vice President Bill Stover was outraged and claimed, “If a 
reasonably livable bill is adopted, I’ll be happy. But the Senate bill doesn’t fit that by any 
definition” (Sinclair 1980). 
 CMA was not totally opposed to the idea of a fund. In fact the CMA supported a $400 
million bill, much smaller than HR 7020 or S 1480, split evenly between the chemical industry 
and the government (Kronholm 1980b p. 2). This bill conveniently made no mention of a 
provision for compensation for victims (Kronholm 1980b p. 2). 
 On September 23, HR 7020 passed easily with a vote of 351 to 23, but the Senate still 
had not scheduled its $4 billion bill for a vote (Superfunds 1980 p. 15). HR 7020, as it passed the 
House, called for a $1.2 billion fund, 75% paid for by oil and chemical industries and 25% paid 
for by the government (House votes 1980 p. 26). By passing HR 7020 the House rejected 
Florio’s $600 million bill that had passed the Commerce committee (House votes 1980 p. 26). 
 Having passed the House, HR 7020 only needed Senate approval to make it to the 
President. However, any hopes that HR 7020 might become law appeared to vanish in November 
after the election. Ronald Reagan had just beat Carter in a landslide election victory. Many 
Senate Democrats lost their seats and Republicans were set to be the majority in the Senate for 
the first time in 28 years. Before the election, the CMA had promised Florio that it would go 
along with HR 7020. With this promise in mind, Florio lobbied for the Senate to abandon its 
larger bill and approve the House’s version. But the election had turned tables on the Florio. 
With Carter and his Democratic Senate colleagues on their way out the door, the CMA saw an 
opportunity for an even smaller bill. The CMA switched their strategy and changed their 
rhetoric. Stover argued that a bill could not possibly pass a lame-duck congress, whether CMA 
supported it or not, and that the CMA would “try again” in the next congress (Kronholm 1980c 
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p. 15). Florio, discouraged by the turn of events, stated in a press conference, “We’re going to 
have no bill this year.” He blamed the CMA for breaking promises it made earlier. The CMA 
responded that Florio was simply looking for a scapegoat for the failed bill (Kronholm 1980c p. 
15). 
 This all changed a couple of weeks later when the Senate made a final push to pass a bill. 
Congress was set to adjourn on December 5, so there was no time to waste if Democrats wanted 
to pass a bill before Republicans took control. Senators knew their original $4 billion bill would 
surely be filibustered, so they compromised and passed a $1.6 billion fund with the chemical 
industry paying for 88% (Scaled down 1980 p. 13). Florio saw his chance and the House quickly 
took up the bill. With the session ending in just a matter of days the House needed to act without 
delay. There was no time for a conference committee, so the House had to pass a bill identical to 
the Senate’s compromise. To ensure an identical bill passed, Florio and his supporters brought 
the bill to the floor under a procedure that blocked any amendments (House gets trimmed 1980 
p. 3). This procedure was risky, however, because it required the bill to be passed with a two 
thirds majority instead of a simple majority (House gets trimmed 1980 p. 3). Despite the risk 
Florio was optimistic, “I’m convinced that it can pass by two-thirds” (House gets trimmed 1980 
p. 3). 
 On the day of the vote President Carter lobbied for the bill, calling congressmen in an 
attempt to gain their support (‘Superfund’ bill 1980 p. 16). The bill passed on December 3 by a 
vote of 274 to 94 (‘Superfund’ bill 1980 p. 16). The finished bill established a $1.6 billion fund, 
88% provided for by chemical industries and only 12% provided for by the government, and 
allowed the government to sue companies it found responsible (‘Superfund’ bill 1980 p. 16). 
Carter signed the bill into law on December 11, 1980, forty days before his term ended. 
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Analysis 
 As previously stated, the purpose of this essay is to explain why CERCLA passed 
relatively easily in 1980. This section will discuss three characteristics of the 96th Congress that 
created the perfect conditions for a comprehensive, environmental reform bill to become law. 
Presidential-Partisan Majority 
 In 1969, political scientist Randall Ripley categorized majority parties of Congress 
throughout history into four types: presidential-bipartisan majorities, presidential-partisan 
majorities, congressional majorities, and truncated majorities (Ripley 1969). Of the four types, 
presidential-partisan majorities are one of the most productive (Ripley 1969). To advance the 
argument, the majority party of the 96th Congress must be shown to be an example of a 
presidential-partisan majority.  
Ripley draws five conclusions about presidential-partisan majorities: Congressional 
leaders viewed themselves as “presidential lieutenants”; these leaders developed innovative 
techniques to progress legislation; both the leaders and the President viewed each Congress as a 
success; the Congress had a large majority that took power “at a time when the national mood 
demanded broad legislative action”; and the innovative techniques used by leaders produced 
legislative success (Ripley 1969 p. 49-50). 
At the start of the 96th Congress it is evident that Congressional leaders viewed 
themselves as “presidential lieutenants”. Senator Culver and Senator Muskie are one example. At 
the start of the first session, President Carter proposed his own bill to establish a $4 billion fund. 
As president, however, he could not introduce legislation as only legislators have that privilege. 
To make sure his proposal reached Congress he needed a Senator or Representative to introduce 
his bill for him. Senator Culver took the responsibility and introduced the $4 billion bill for the 
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President, despite the fact that he wanted a much smaller bill. He later introduced his own $800 
million bill. 
Leaders of the 96th Congress also developed innovative techniques to progress 
legislation. At the end of the second session the lame-duck senators recognized that they needed 
to cut their bill down to better match the House version. They could not pass a new, smaller bill 
for two reasons. First, the constitution requires that any bill increasing revenue must originate in 
the House. Because it would tax the oil and chemical industries, CERCLA was a revenue-
increasing bill and had to start in the House. The Senate would have to wait until the House 
passed the bill before it could do the same, even if it had already voted to pass it previously. 
Second, the Senate could not wait for the House to pass the bill because the December 5 
adjournment date was approaching quickly. As a solution, Senate leaders took HR 7020, a bill 
that had already passed the House, stripped it of its contents, and placed a smaller version of S 
1480 inside. All that was left was for the House to agree to the Senate amendments and for 
President Carter to sign it. Clearly, this technique worked, fulfilling the last characteristic of a 
presidential-partisan majority. 
According to his last State of the Union address, President Carter viewed the 96th 
Congress as a success. He congratulated lawmakers for passing much needed environmental 
reform and urged future Congresses to fully utilize the new program.  
Party Polarization and Policy Productivity 
 Party polarization plays a significant role in policy productivity. Lawrence Dodd and 
Scot Schraufnagel have written multiple times about polarization in congress. They define party 
polarization as “the ideological distance between the majority party and minority party” 
combined with “the loyalty of members to their party” (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009). In other 
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words, as intraparty unity and interparty differences increase, party polarization will likewise 
increase. As intraparty unity and interparty differences decrease, so to will party polarization. 
Dodd and Schraufnagel lay out their main argument in 2009 in Reconsidering Party Polarization 
and Policy Productivity: A Curvilinear Perspective. They argue that congress is most productive 
when moderately polarized (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009). They also claim that congress is least 
productive under conditions of high or low party polarization (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009). 
Figure 1 graphs the ideological difference between the parties in both chambers of congress from 
1879 to 2012. A higher score means higher polarization while a lower score means lower 
polarization.  
Figure 1: Party polarization in both chambers per congress 
 
Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia. (2013). [Graph illustration of party  
polarization 1879-2012]. The polarization of the congressional parties. Retrieved from 
http://voteview.com/images/polar_housesenate_difference.png 
 
The figure shows high party polarization between the late 19th century and early 20th century. 
Party polarization decreased significantly in the middle of the 20th century only to rise again just 
before the new millenium. The 96th congress (1979-1981) scored between 0.5 and 0.6 for both 
chambers, making it one of the more moderately polarized congresses. 
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 If the data from Figure 1 is applied to Dodd and Schraufnagel’s theory, the 96th congress, 
with its moderate polarization, should have been more productive than succeeding congresses. 
Figure 2 places each congress, from the 67th to 107th, in a scatter plot where the independent 
variable is party polarization and the dependent variable is the percentage of topical legislation 
passed (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009).  
Figure 2: Polarization and percentage of topical legislation passed per congress 
 
Dodd, L. C., & Schraufnagel, S. (2009). Reconsidering party polarization and policy productivity:  
A curvilinear perspective. In L. C. Dodd (Ed.) & B. L. Oppenheimer (Ed.), Congress 
Reconsidered. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
According to figure 2 the 96th congress falls on the outskirts of moderate polarization. This is to 
be expected since Figure 1 shows that the 96th congress was at the very beginning of an upward 
trend in party polarization. As a moderately polarized congress, the 96th congress passed roughly 
thirty percent of its proposed topical legislation. According to Dodd and Schraufnagel’s analysis, 
a score between twenty and forty percent demonstrates satisfactory policy productivity (Dodd 
and Schraufnagel 2009). This score proves nothing, however, if it is not put within context. With 
a score of thirty percent, the 96th congress scores higher than most other congresses in the graph, 
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specifically the 105th through 108th congresses. These congresses were much more polarized, as 
demonstrated by Figure 1, and therefore lie in the bottom left corner of Figure 2. This means that 
the 105th through 108th congress were less productive. Because the party polarization of the 
96th congress was more moderate, it was more productive. 
Their most recent work, Congress and the Polarity Paradox, measures the effect 
legislative conflict, the sum of party polarization and member incivility, has on the passage of 
landmark legislation (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2012). Their findings suggest a positive 
relationship between moderate legislative conflict and landmark legislation success (Dodd and 
Schraufnagel 2012). As moderate legislative conflict increases so does landmark legislation 
success (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2012). The 96th congress is located in the large cluster at the 
center of Figure 1. This means that the 96th congress had moderate legislative conflict and 
produced moderate levels of landmark legislation. 
Presidential Rhetoric 
 “As a result, the president’s means of affecting legislation through speeches may not 
hinge on public support for the president’s policies. Instead, presidents may directly influence 
the decisions of legislators by sending signals that legislators need to make efficient, yet 
relatively informed, decisions. The success of direct signaling, as I will detail throughout this 
book, depends heavily on the policy area under debate.” (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006 p. 2). 
 “I maintain that presidential signals directly influence legislators by providing them with 
information they need to make efficient, yet relatively informed, decisions.” (Eshbaugh-Soha 
2006 p. 3). 
 Some scholars have looked to presidential messages to congress as a way of measuring 
policy success. Jose Villalobos, Justin Vaughn, and Julia Azari identified four categories of 
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presidential messages that executives use to help their preferred bill in the legislative process: 
mandate rhetoric, bipartisan appeals, signaling, agency input (Villalobos et al. 2012). Mandate 
rhetoric refers to the electoral mandate of the President (Villalobos et al. 2012). Should a 
president believe that his electoral victory was a mandate from the people to pursue some policy, 
the president may use that as a way to influence congressmen (Villalobos et al. 2012). The 
second category, bipartisan appeals, refers to attempts by presidents to win support for a bill by 
encouraging both parties to participate in the process (Villalobos et al. 2012). The third category, 
signaling, is the declaration of a president’s policy priorities to make lawmakers more aware of 
what the president wants to see enacted (Villalobos et al. 2012). The fourth category, agency 
input, is the president’s use of substantive policy information collected by agency or policy 
experts (Villalobos et al. 2012). Their research suggests that the first three categories have no 
impact on the president’s legislative success (Villalobos et al. 2012). Only agency input appears 
to help a president pass his policy priorities (Villalobos et al. 2012). Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha 
made a similar observation in 2006. He claimed, “that presidential signals directly influence 
legislators by providing them with information they need to make efficient, yet relatively 
informed, decisions.” (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006 p. 3).  
Any message or speech directed toward Congress can be used to determine which kind of 
messages the President used to promote his policy. In this case, State of the Union addresses, 
letters to congressional leaders, and speeches about CERCLA are used to measure President 
Carter’s use of agency input. 
 On June 13, 1979 President Carter delivered a letter to the Speaker of the House and the 
President of the Senate to inform them of his administration’s proposal for superfund legislation. 
The letter outlines the scope of the legislation, explains who will fund the program, and 
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establishes a timetable for the enactment of certain provisions (Carter 1979a). Nowhere in the 
letter does Carter mention the need for bipartisanship. In August of the same year, President 
Carter signaled to the entire congress his environmental policy priorities (Carter 1979b). In it he 
provided EPA estimates of dump sites around the US and forecasted the costs of cleaning up 
those dump sites (Carter 1979b). Nowhere in his message did he appeal to bipartisanship or an 
electoral mandate (Carter 1979b). In his State of the Union address at the beginning of 1980, 
President Carter devotes a section of his speech to his proposed $1.6 billion bill but makes no 
mention of bipartisanship or mandates throughout the entire speech (Carter 1980). In these three 
examples Carter provides agency input and signals his policy priorities, but does not refer to an 
electoral mandate or appeal to bipartisanship. 
 Now, Carter’s lack of use of bipartisan appeals or mandate references did not help in 
passing CERCLA. Villalobos and his peers simply found that these two kinds of messages do not 
positively impact legislation. If Carter used them, it would not have hurt CERCLA’s chances of 
passing congress, but it also would not have helped (Villalobos et al. 2012). The focus of this 
section is on Carter’s reliance on agency expert input in his messages and addresses directed at 
congress. 
Conclusion 
 The 96th Congress occurred at a unique moment in the late 20th century. Republicans 
had controlled the White House since 1969 while Democrats had controlled both chambers of 
congress since 1955. Carter’s one term presidency, and its coinciding Congresses, would be the 
last example of a unified government for another twelve years. But it is debatable whether the 
96th Congress’ status as a unified government helped in passing CERCLA into law. To 
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understand the congressional success of CERCLA, other characteristics of the 96th Congress 
must be identified. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the 96th congress was moderately polarized, resulting in higher 
policy productivity. An upward trend in party polarization immediately followed the Carter 
presidency, leading to decreased policy productivity in subsequent congresses. Carter also 
enjoyed the advantages of what Ripley would call a presidential partisan majority. His party held 
a significant majority in the House and Senate and did not need to rely on the minority to enact 
legislation. When speaking about his proposed legislation, Carter’s rhetoric only helped the bill 
on its way through the legislative process. He did not rely on references to electoral mandates or 
appeal to bipartisanship, messages that have little impact on the success of legislation. Instead, 
he relied on agency expert input and analysis to help make his case for the Superfund. 
  
 17 
 
 
References 
 
Binder, S. (2003). Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Washington, DC:  
 The Brookings Institution. 
 
Carter, J. (1979a, June 13). Hazardous waste disposal letter to the Speaker of the House and the  
President of the Senate transmitting proposed legislation. Retrieved from  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32473&st=hazardous&st1= 
 
Carter, J. (1979b, August 2). Environmental priorities and programs message to the congress.  
Retrieved from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32684&st=hazardous&st1= 
 
Carter, J. (1980, January 21). The state of the union annual message to the congress. Retrieved  
from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33062&st=hazardous&st1= 
 
Dallas (AP). (1980, June 19). Panel oks billion $ superfund. Daytona Beach Morning Journal, p.  
11A. 
 
Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia. (2013). [Graph illustration of party  
polarization 1879-2012]. The polarization of the congressional parties. Retrieved from 
http://voteview.com/images/polar_housesenate_difference.png 
 
Dodd, L. C., & Schraufnagel, S. (2009). Reconsidering party polarization and policy 
productivity:  
A curvilinear perspective. In L. C. Dodd (Ed.) & B. L. Oppenheimer (Ed.), Congress 
Reconsidered. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
Dodd, L. C., & Schraufnagel, S. (2012). Congress and the polarity paradox: Party polarization,  
member incivility and enactment of landmark legislation, 1891–1994. Congress & The  
Presidency, 39(2), 109-132. 
 
Eshbaugh-Soha, M. (2006). The president’s speeches: Beyond “going public”. Boulder, CO:  
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
 
Kronholm, W. (1980a, September 12). Senate urged to approve toxic waste “superfund”. The  
Lewiston Daily Sun. p. 16. 
 
Kronholm, W. (1980b, September 17). Test for ‘superfund’. St. Joseph News Press. p. 2C. 
 18 
 
Kronholm, W. (1980c, November 15). Congressman charges industry scuttled superfund bill. 
The  
Lewiston Journal. p. 15. 
 
Reid, T.R. (1980). Congressional Odyssey. Freeman, WH & Company. 
 
Ripley, R. B. (1969). Majority party leadership in congress. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and  
Company. 
 
Sinclair, W. (1980, September 2). U.S. chemical firms fight superfund bill aimed at cleanup. The  
Montreal Gazette. p. 25. 
 
Switzer, C. S., Bulan, L. A. (2002). CERCLA: Comprehensive environmental response,  
compensation, and liability act (superfund). US: American Bar Association. 
 
Villalobos, J. D., Vaughn, J. S., & Azari, J. R. (2012). Politics or policy? How rhetoric matters to  
presidential leadership of congress. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42(3), 549-576. 
 
‘Superfund’ ok’d. (1980, June 28). The Spokesman Review. p. 5. 
 
Industries hit ‘superfund’ idea. (1980, September 12). The Milwaukee Journal.  
p. 15. 
 
Superfunds: Two down, one to go. (1980, September 20). The Lewiston  
Journal. p. 15. 
 
House votes toxic waste cleanup ‘superfund’. (1980, September 24). Record  
Journal. p. 26. 
 
Scaled down superfund bill sent to house. (1980, November 25). Dispatch. p.  
13. 
 
House gets trimmed toxic waste fund bill. (1980b, December 1). Dispatch. p. 3. 
 
‘Superfund’ bill for toxic wastes now up to Carter. (1980, December 4). The  
Free Lance Star. p. 16. 
 
 
 
